Addressing Limitations of Port Knocking

A brief summary of the problems posed by port-knocking protocols is as

• It is difficult to stop replay attacks from attackers who can monitor port-knocking sequences.

• The lack of effective data transmission limits the types of information and even the cryptosystems that may be used to encrypt sequence data.

• Any intermediate IDS may set off alarm bells when a port-knock sequence is being sent over the network.

Sequence-busting attacks are trivial to perform, because packet headers are not hard to duplicate and spoof.

By using payload data in SPA, we can overcome each of these deficiencies:

• SPA solves the replay problem by including random data within every SPA packet. Each SPA packet is built according to a well-defined cleartext packet format (the specific format used by fwknop is discussed in Chapter 13). This format includes space for the random data, and once the packet is constructed, it is encrypted. Including random data ensures that no two SPA packets are identical—even those that make the same access request to the SPA server. By storing the MD5 sum of each successfully decrypted SPA packet on the server side, we can repeatedly send the same access request, knowing that no two SPA packets will have the same MD5 sum. Replay attacks are thus easily thwarted by comparing the MD5 sum of any new SPA packets with those of the previously monitored packets.

• SPA solves the data transmission problem by using the payload portion of IP packets, similarly to the way in which TCP encapsulates application layer data. Using packet payloads facilitates the use of asymmetric ciphers for encryption because larger amounts of data can be transferred by packet payloads than any port-knocking implementation (which just uses packet headers). We can even build a command channel (i.e., the communication of complete commands within the encrypted SPA

follows:

payload) over SPA. We will see in Chapter 13 that fwknop supports both access requests and a full command-channel implementation.

SPA ensures that its network communications do not appear as port scans because it uses only a single packet to transmit the authentication information. This way, an IDS won't see a series of probes to a range of ports. Because the SPA payload is encrypted, an IDS can't decode the content of SPA messages either; anyone sniffing will see the SPA packet as an unintelligible blob of payload data.

• Using SPA thwarts spoofing attacks because an attacker cannot trivially break the SPA protocol simply by spoofing packets to the SPA server from an SPA client system. (Of course, any system that examines packet data over a network is susceptible to a DoS if it is flooded with garbage packet data, but this is not a weakness in the SPA protocol itself.)

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